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Politics, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow 
 
 
Abstract 
This article starts from the premise that empathy is an inherent part of social and political 
life but that this is not sufficiently theorised in International Relations. Building on the 
burgeoning debates on emotions in world politics, it argues that the study of empathy 
should be developed more rigorously by establishing an interdisciplinary and critical 
framework for understanding the experiences and processes of empathy in IR. The central 
contribution of the paper is two-fold: firstly, it highlights limitations of the dominant 
perspective on empathy in IR, and secondly, it argues that a range of meanings may be 
attributed to empathy when examined within the socio-political conditions of particular 
contexts. Drawing on research on the conflict in Israel and Palestine, the article identifies 
and articulates two such alternative interpretations: empathy as non-violent resistance and 
as a strategy of normalisation. 
 
 
Do not judge your neighbour until you walk two moons in his moccasins.1 
 
Empathy is accepted as a core capacity of human beings and as a fundamental component 
of social and political life in disciplines as varied as political theory, neuroscience, applied 
linguistics, social psychology, and philosophy.  Although it has emerged as a relevant 
concept in the fields of peace studies and conflict resolution, it has received relatively little 
attention in International Relations (IR) despite the latter’s burgeoning literature on 
emotions.  Notwithstanding the significance of the role that it plays, there have been 
remarkably few attempts to rigorously theorise how empathy operates within the 
(international) political sphere.2  For the most part, attention has been focused on the 
interpersonal or intergroup dimension of empathy in mediation, problem-solving 
workshops, or peace-building programs without considering its wider political role within 
and between states and societies.  At the same time, however, increasing recognition has 
been voiced in the public sphere, by President Barack Obama among others, of an ‘empathy 
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deficit’3 while other scholars regard the contemporary period to represent the coming of 
the ‘age of empathy’.4 
With such claims contributing to a discourse of empathy identified as a positive 
influence in the public sphere, it is timely to explore the role attributed to the concept in 
greater depth.  With this in mind, the article offers a preliminary mapping of the definitions 
and uses of the term empathy across different disciplines.  While not an exhaustive account, 
it serves to establish a platform for the development of a more critical engagement with the 
theory and practice of empathy.  The article articulates a number of conceptual limitations 
to the mainstream discourse of empathy which tends to assume a normative, progressive 
dimension.5  Such shortcomings include the absence of recognition of a ‘politics of 
empathy’; many of the current debates neither adequately examine the socio-political 
conditions in which empathy may or may not operate nor recognise the political character 
of empathy when it is adopted by actors.  A further significant lacuna in the literature is 
attention to processes whereby empathy may be enabled or constrained from flowing 
across different levels of analysis in societies, thus embracing the individual and collectives.  
Integrating empathy into recent debates on narratives and emotions in IR which have begun 
to theorise how emotions as motivators for political behaviour operate across the political 
spectrum from individuals to groups to states remains a challenge for IR scholars.6  It has 
long been recognised that sustainable engagement with conflict requires addressing its 
emotional dimension7, yet despite the primacy of empathy within this transformative 
toolbox, it has been given little explicit critical attention.   
The article acknowledges the important contribution of a normative dimension of 
empathy and its powerful role in reconciliation processes (among others), yet also argues 
for the need to locate empathy within its socio-political context and recognise the 
asymmetries of power embedded in relationships.8  As Lauren Berlant writes, ‘the project of 
critique seeks not to destroy its object but to explain the dynamics of its optimism and 
exclusions’.9  In this light the article seeks to reveal the presumptions underpinning 
dominant perspectives on empathy and to problematise these by identifying alternative 
readings of empathy.   
One of the most challenging cases in international politics, the protracted conflict in 
Israel and Palestine is nonetheless an important site for the study of empathy.  This is largely 
because of the considerable focus on people-to-people peace-building activities initiated by 
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local and international organisations after the Oslo Accords - for which empathy was a core 
ingredient - and the failure of those activities to transform the conflict at a macro-level or 
prevent the repeated escalations of violence.  Yet despite the mistrust and disillusionment 
this has created for many, there remains a commitment amongst a wide range of individuals 
and organisations to contact activities which embrace various understandings of empathy 
and dialogue which, as discussed below, may themselves be a source of contestation and 
conflict.  Given its prevalence, understanding the role of empathy is an important 
component in analysing the conflict and its potential for transformation. 
I conducted approximately twenty interviews during two periods of fieldwork in 
2013-14 which sought to explore the dynamics of empathy through encounters with Israelis 
and Palestinians.  I focused on civil society and grassroots organisations working with non-
violent approaches to the conflict10 in Israel and the West Bank and spoke with their leaders 
or volunteers.  The majority of interviewees have been involved with peace-building 
organisations for a long time and have experienced different periods of the conflict 
(reflected in shifts in their perspectives regarding empathy, contact and dialogue activities 
with the outgroup).  Motivations for their involvement varied; some had been former 
combatants who had rejected violence, some were peace educators or students, others 
were pacifists, peace activists, those who had lost loved ones, and so on. I sought to 
understand what definitions of empathy individuals held, how and why they engaged in 
empathy (if they did), with whom they were empathic, and what role they perceived 
empathy to play in the conflict and its transformation.  The focus on grassroots actors 
reflects both the characterisation of empathy in the literatures as a predominantly 
interpersonal or individual process and the predominant site of people-to-people peace-
building activities.11   
Drawing on this research the article empirically highlights the aforementioned 
limitations of the existing discourse by focusing on two interpretations from Israel-Palestine 
which reveal the range of meanings which may be attributed to empathy; namely, empathy 
understood as both a practice of non-violent resistance and as a strategy for normalisation.  
Characterising empathy in such terms broadly reflects the Coxian distinction between 
critical theory and problem-solving theory.  In Robert Cox’s well-known framing, critical 
theory ‘does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them 
into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in 
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the process of changing’.12  This contains an emancipatory capacity which is reflected in the 
meaning attributed by actors to empathy as non-violent resistance.  Conversely, ‘the 
general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work 
smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble’.13  This reflects a 
‘normalising’ approach to the conflict in Israel-Palestine which seeks to make the existing 
conditions work better rather than challenge the historical conditions and asymmetries of 
the occupation.  Exploring these differences is not intended to subsume all Palestinian and 
Israeli experiences within these interpretations.  Instead, it seeks to draw attention to 
patterns evident in a relatively small sample of interviews in order to raise a key question: 
how is meaning attributed to empathy in IR?  Examining empathy in this light demonstrates 
that the meaning attributed to empathy offers a spectrum of possible practices and 
interpretations. 
Recognition of empathy – like emotion – relies largely, in the social sciences at least, 
on discourse analysis.  It is through language and representation that actors – individuals 
and collectives – attribute meaning to action and cognition.  Linguistic expressions of 
connection offer a means to identify what Lynne Cameron has called ‘gestures of 
empathy’.14  The identification of empathy cannot be adequately interpreted, I suggest, 
without reference to the specific socio-political conditions of its expression.  This is, 
therefore, an interpretivist rather than a causal argument about empathy.  Interpreting the 
meanings attributed to empathy by individuals and collectives seeks to contribute to an 
understanding of how these practices shape – and are shaped by - social identities and 
narratives of conflict.15  Whilst the focus remains on empathy as a discrete concept for the 
purposes of the argument, this is not intended to detract from the recognition that empathy 
is inextricably entwined with a variety of other emotional and cognitive processes.  Although 
it is beyond the scope of this article to do justice to the many divisions between and within 
groups in Israeli and Palestinian societies, I do not assume that these interpretations of 
empathy are fully representative of any group as a whole and they are not intended to 
downplay the social dynamics – including the potential disruption of collective narratives by 
dissenting voices - within groups.  There is sufficient coherence within the empirical 
evidence, however, to suggest that these are interpretations which resonate with a range of 
individuals and organisations which have adopted particular narratives of the conflict in 
Israel-Palestine and that they justify the call to more rigorously engage with empathy in IR.  
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The argument develops through the following steps.  I first provide an orientation for the 
theoretical perspective towards empathy before navigating the definitional debates 
surrounding the concept for the purposes of the current argument.  I then turn to examine 
the meanings attributed to empathy in the empirical context as identified above. 
 
(Re)framing empathy 
As earlier debates between positivism and critical theory clearly revealed, to represent 
voices and reality in certain ways is to adopt particular perspectives on the production of 
knowledge.  The epistemological conditions of empathy as relational and intersubjective 
reveal this in practice because we explore stories of connection (or lack thereof), and so 
recognise that empathy cannot simply be an abstract intellectual concept.  It is embodied, 
messy, personal and political.  Moreover, if, as I argue that it does, empathy contains within 
it the possibility of social and political transformation, then researching the dynamics of 
empathy brings with it a responsibility to reflect upon the construction of our subjectivities.  
In this vein, Oded Lӧwenheim has written that ’the individual [is] not just an interpreter of 
social reality, [but] someone who can understand her/himself through thinking about social 
institutions, practices, and phenomena'.16  This transcends the merely personal and places 
the story within a social and political context that ties the life and identities of the individual 
to the life of the society he or she lives in.  In other words, it is akin to C. Wright Mills’ vision 
of the sociological imagination.  The task is, as Mills writes, to ‘grasp history and biography 
and the relations between the two within society’.17  Grasping this relationship in the 
context of a critical study of the dynamics of empathy is crucial because it situates 
individuals embedded in particular social, political and cultural conditions and facilitates an 
understanding of what hinders or enables both individual empathy and broader empathy 
flows within and between societies. 
Questions of empathy in lived experience do not fall neatly into the neuroscientific, 
psychological, or philosophical accounts of empathy but are messy and complex.  As already 
suggested, they bring to the foreground the question of knowledge creation: how is it that 
meaning is given by actors to acts of empathy and how is it interpreted by those who listen?   
Empathetic engagement is not straightforward for either party: ‘it is uneven, mediated and 
shot through with incommensurabilities’.18  This reflects Christine Sylvester’s argument that 
‘empathetic cooperation [offers] a navigational method of politics at borderlands’ through 
6 
 
which ‘our subjectivities travel to accommodate the new empathies’.19  Empathy always 
requires attention to the way in which subjects position themselves in relation to the 
multiple identities and sources of conflict they are embedded within.  The face-to-face 
encounters narrated through fieldwork revealed both interpersonal and structural relations 
at play in shaping practices of empathy and call for the contours of empathy to be 
delineated with greater reflection.  Doing so not only draws attention to the production of 
meaning and subjectivities concerning empathy but it also engages with the social, 
linguistic, psychological and political conditions which shape these processes. 
Empathy is a term which has been widely adopted in different literatures and for 
which there is no single, coherent and consistent meaning, although broad similarities can 
be traced across definitions and uses.20  In what follows, I will sketch some of the broad 
lines of debate in order to briefly indicate the variety of disciplines in which empathy has 
become a significant part.  This is by no means an exhaustive account, but it serves as a 
platform on which to articulate my definition of empathy for the purposes of this article.  
Empathy can be defined as that ‘faculty which enables us to feel with another 
human being, to cognitively and affectively put ourselves into his or her place, and therefore 
to become aware of the other's feelings, needs, and wants’.21  Variously named, forms of 
empathy, sympathy and compassion22 are commonly perceived by philosophers and others 
as morally relevant concepts in that acquiring a ‘sense of others’ is a moral virtue and an 
important factor of social life.23  In this sense it is argued to be a normative good which 
contains within it the seeds of progress for humanity.  This discourse of empathy, reflecting 
its philosophical origins in Enlightenment humanism, dominant paradigms of 
cosmopolitanism and human rights, offers a positive recognition of the value of empathy in 
terms of its capacity to expand the boundaries of our moral universe, to contribute to social 
cohesion, cooperation, reconciliation and ‘humanising’ processes.  Within this tradition, a 
‘sense of the other’ qua (equal) human being is both self-evident and universal.  As Steven 
Pinker has noted, ‘the Rights Revolutions show that a moral way of life often requires a 
decisive rejection of instinct, culture, religion, and standard practice.  In their place is an 
ethics that is inspired by empathy and reason and stated in the language of rights’.24  These 
theoretical debates, which shifted the frame of reference from the state to the individual in 
IR, also address the moral responsibilities we have towards other individuals as a result of 
‘enlarging the boundaries of compassion’.25  While such positive connotations of empathy 
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may be central to conflict transformation and reconciliation processes, they also imply, 
somewhat problematically as Carolyn Pedwell has noted, a certain teleological aspect to 
empathy in terms of its inherently progressive, benign, and civilising character.26   
To be clear, there is no intrinsic problem with the normative qualities implied in this 
discourse of empathy; what is at stake is the degree to which this – somewhat abstract, top-
down and, in some cases, institutionalised27 – approach to empathy tends to exclude 
sufficient acknowledgement of the relations of power which structure context-specific and 
situated conflicts.  As Andrew Linklater argued ‘thin conceptions of cosmopolitan citizenship 
revolve around compassion for the vulnerable but leave asymmetries of power and wealth 
intact’.28  In other words, we must interrogate the ideological work which such humanist 
values enable.  Representing empathy as one thing rather than others – as a benign, 
beneficial process of reconciliation, for example – is to construct identities of people and 
states in particular ways.  Such an approach contains within it the potential seeds of a 
hierarchical, asymmetrical relationship between the empathiser and the recipient.29  In such 
circumstances the language of empathy may be ‘presumptuous’; it may serve to 
‘disempower people’ by making interpretive claims regarding the experiences of others.30 
Consequently, it serves to constitute particular subject-positions whereby the weaker, more 
vulnerable, needy party receives a benevolent empathy from the stronger party, or, as 
Kathy Ferguson argues in the context of reconciliation, ‘empathy can readily be recruited 
into a gesture of appropriate [sic] (as in “I know just what you mean” when I really don’t 
know at all)’31 thus silencing alternative forms of knowledge, expression, and experience.  
Such a discourse may be more likely to pre-assign subjectivities to actors thereby imposing 
in advance a reification of narratives and determining the appropriate recipient (and 
vulnerable) subjects of empathy (or sympathy).32  Adopting such an approach not only 
raises expectations for a positive (and affective) remedy for the situation, but forecloses an 
interrogation of how and why actors themselves experience, adopt, utilise, and understand 
empathy in particular social and political conditions.  This serves to obscure recognition of 
the contested meaning of empathy, the reasons or motives for which it is adopted and the 
ways it may be used, as well as its role in producing relations of power which may benefit 
some more than others: together these dimensions create a ‘politics of empathy’.  Raising 
questions which underpin the present discussion, Pedwell has argued that 
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efforts to generate empathy might be less important or productive in some 
contexts than examining the potential causes and implications of empathetic 
‘failures’ – those circumstances in which empathy reaches its limit point, is 
ignored or rejected by its intended recipient(s), has antithetical consequences 
to those anticipated, or simply makes no sense (or difference) in the midst of 
given social conditions and political hierarchies.  Rather than assuming that 
empathy is a ‘good’ thing […] [we should] consider a range of more […] critical 
questions: What is empathy?  What does it do?  Who does it serve? What are 
its risks?33 
 
By addressing these questions, the study of empathy can move beyond the 
dichotomy which exists within current representations of empathy in realist and liberal 
thought in IR.  Whilst much of the realist cannon implicitly rejects the relevance of 
empathy,34 strands of cosmopolitan liberal thought tend to extract it from its socio-political 
context and offer a rather monochromatic representation of empathy as a benign, beneficial 
and moral process which forms a crucial element of a (cosmopolitan) ethics of political 
community.  This macro-level approach to empathy often assumes that the expressions, 
interpretations and benefits of empathy are the same irrespective of place, context, and 
relations of power.  In contrast, I argue, the meaning attributed to empathy varies from one 
cultural and political context to the next.35  A micro approach investigates how empathy 
may be ‘constituted by and function in particular cultural and political environments’.36   
 
(Re)defining empathy 
Empathy is generally accepted as a mode of being which connects us to others and which 
promotes intersubjective relations, enabling the individual subject to move beyond the 
limits of her own knowledge.37  The intersubjectivity of the relationship between self and 
other is an ontological and epistemological premise of empathy.  Indeed, Richard Ned 
Lebow has written that ‘[e]mpathy in turn encourages us to see others as our ontological 
equals and to recognize the self-actualizing benefits of close relationships with others.38  It is 
hardly surprising, therefore, that one of the most common definitions of empathy focuses 
on accessing the thoughts and feelings of others; in other words, to walk in the shoes of the 
other.  On a fundamental level, empathy involves recognising others as human beings.  This 
9 
 
resonates with Axel Honneth’s argument for a ‘founding moment of intersubjective 
recognition in the process of human interaction’.39  As fundamental as recognising others as 
ontological equals is to exercising empathy successfully, so an inability or refusal to 
recognise others as such contributes to blocking empathy.   
The immanent potential of such an intersubjective relationship denotes a capacity 
for transformation.  Such change must begin at home, with the self.  As Clare Hemmings has 
argued, ‘Empathy can be the mechanism through which…subjects transform their own 
comfort as subjects in order to appreciate and understand the other’.40  The intersubjective 
ramifications of empathy reside in the possibility of shifts in the subject positions of 
individuals.  Such shifts emerge from the process of empathy as it is described by Nava 
Sonnenschein, director of the School for Peace (Neve Shalom–Wahat al-Salam) in Israel: ‘To 
understand deeply the existence of the other…not to save face…not to project the blame, 
not to try to make symmetry…really to care about the other side and also to take 
responsibility [for] what you should do in order to change the situation’.41  This shift may be 
explored in the example of the Israeli or American Jew, a self-declared liberal/moderate 
who considers Israeli checkpoints comparable to airport security control, yet participates in 
a MachsomWatch tour of the West Bank or the enclave created by the separation barrier 
north of Jerusalem.42  What tensions and possibilities may reside and emerge through this 
experience that challenge existing subjectivities? 
Broadly speaking, psychology and neuroscience debates have recognised that 
empathy is able to inhibit aggressive behaviour.43  Within these disciplines has also emerged 
a distinction between automatic and cognitive empathy.44  The former is considered akin to 
an automatic emotional response to the experience of others – emotional contagion and 
emotional recognition/responsiveness are common alternative terms - whereas the latter 
requires actors to consciously choose to engage in empathy and refers to a capacity for 
agency and cognitive perspective taking.  This distinction also touches on the debate in 
emotions research whether emotions are primarily cognitive or bodily perceptions.45  
Cognitive empathy invites the actor to understand the perspective of the other while 
not having to share it on an emotional level.  While sympathy denotes an element of 
concern or care for the other, cognitive empathy may be used to undermine another actor 
and this is embodied in the first rule of military strategy: know thy enemy.  Along these 
lines, Matthew Waldman has noted that ‘empathy as practiced by a government can be 
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considered as an analytical tool that does not require any kind of isomorphism or the 
sharing of feelings’.46  This form of empathy also requires an ability to tolerate the 
emotional and moral ambivalence that exercising empathy may give rise to.47  Crucially, the 
analytical distinction between cognition and emotion serves to highlight two important 
factors for the present definition of empathy.  The first is the indeterminate character of 
empathy: a benevolent or positive intention should not be assumed prior to investigation.  
Second, the increasing rejection of the distinction between cognition and emotion across 
disciplines recognises the role that emotions play in shaping actors’ motives, intentions, 
judgements, reasoning and beliefs.48 
Empathy is thus conceived here as an intersubjective, dynamic, cognitive and 
emotional process which operates across multiple timescales.49  It involves a cognitive 
understanding of the other’s point of view as well as, potentially, the sharing of emotions.  
This means being willing to accept another person or group’s interpretation of events.  Even 
if an individual is only exercising cognitive empathy towards the other, s/he cannot divorce 
their cognitive processes from their own emotions which shapes how they may process the 
information received.  While empathy always requires individual cognitive-emotional 
processes, collective empathy refers to collective narratives regarding the recognition and 
legitimization of the other and captures the complex relationship between individuals and 
groups in terms of beliefs, identities, emotional orientations, and narratives.   
Cameron’s discourse dynamics model of empathy has identified a series of stages 
which lend a temporal dimension to our conceptual and empirical exploration.50  Cameron’s 
model offers the following four stages: 1) the background conditions for empathy (all that 
participants are and bring to the dialogue, including, procedural preparations for talks, 
individual/group attitudes and beliefs or biological disposition); 2) the local discourse 
dynamics of empathy which take place during dialogue (timeframe of minutes); 3) the 
emerging discourse patterns of empathy through dialogue  (timeframe of minutes/hours); 
and 4) emergent empathic stabilities which emerge across days/weeks/months/years in the 
public sphere and in political or social discourse.  Whilst stages 2 and 3 may be identified 
within various people-to-people activities, the absence of the latter stage of emergent 
empathic stabilities from elite discourse or public opinion in contemporary Israeli and 
Palestinian societies contributes to some of the tension identified around the effectiveness 
and purpose of interpersonal or intergroup dialogue encounters (discussed below).  
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Illustrating the significance of time for empathic processes, one of the teachers involved in 
the Peace Research in the Middle East (PRIME) dual narrative project in Israel-Palestine 
reflected that 
 
When I saw the narrative of the other side, first I was angry and frustrated 
at how different it is from ours.  I felt it was not based on facts but on 
stories and emotions.  Later, I learned to cognitively accept the difference, 
but still felt that our narrative was superior to theirs.  Only recently did I 
learn to see the logic behind their narrative and even to emotionally feel 
empathy to what they went through.  If this took me four years, imagine 
what it will take the pupils or their parents.51   
 
What this makes clear is that empathic interactions take time, the absence of which 
sets up a clear obstacle to the sustainable transformation of relationships.  These are likely 
to be iterative processes which happen over long periods of time with various actors and 
through which change always remains a possibility.52  In this vein – and in the tradition of 
critical theory - I argue that a dynamic process of empathy always contains an immanent 
potential for transformation of the self and of self-other relationships.  As Yiftach Ron and 
Ifat Maoz have argued, ‘[c]onfronting contested narratives in ethnopolitical conflict […] is a 
transformative form of intergroup engagement because it can create spaces for different 
affective and ethical relations with [self] and others’.53  Crucially, however, such change is 
not inevitable or determined; actors who take a decision to empathise during dialogue in a 
particular moment are not bound to act in particular ways thereafter.  Their ongoing actions 
will be part of a complex process involving material interests and ideational factors which 
may enable or constrain particular outcomes.  It is the actions that follow the decision to 
engage in empathy which may reveal the agent’s intention to contribute in some way to the 
well-being of another.  Such commitment needs to be built over time through repetition and 
repeated engagement.  As expressed by both Palestinian and Israeli participants, ‘you have 
to cultivate the change…Because reality is very strong, can erase the impact.  It’s not 
natural, you have to build it.  You can feel empathy and do nothing.’54 
Parties in intractable conflicts tend to establish monolithic identities for themselves 
and the other which are bolstered by historical narratives recruited for such a purpose.  
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There is little scope for revealing vulnerability to the other within such identities and 
narratives which shape (and obscure) the capacity for recognition of the other’s narrative 
and identity.  While this step towards vulnerability remains important for the 
transformation of both individuals and groups to take place, there is a larger shift at stake 
because, as Judith Butler argues, ‘we do not simply have recourse to single and discrete 
norms of recognition, but to more general conditions, historically articulated and enforced, 
of “recognizability”.55  These political and historically contingent conditions shape the 
possibility of recognising particularly constituted subjects and impact on the (a)symmetries 
of such recognition.  As such, a focus on empathy and its enabling/restraining conditions 
leads us to ask: how do existing norms [narratives and structures] allocate recognition 
differentially56 and what are the implications of this for sustaining or transforming conflict?  
Responsibility, rather than simple reciprocity, may therefore be required to shape the 
intersubjective dynamics in situations of asymmetry.  Nava Sonnenschein reflected this 
argument when she indicated that Israeli Jews have to shift: ‘from thinking about yourself as 
not connected, to really take the responsibility that you are, when they talk about the 
Occupiers, even if you are from Tel Aviv and you are not serving there as a soldier, that you 
are part of the system that is doing it to the other people.  That you acknowledge the 
asymmetry in power relations’.57  This question of responsibility and reciprocity is highly 
pertinent to a politics of empathy given that the struggle for recognition lies at the heart of 
conflict and is, in particular, reflected in asymmetrical structures and relationships within 
Israeli and Palestinian societies.58 
 
Empathy as nonviolent resistance 
Whilst the meaning and scope of non-violence is broad and contested, the narrative of non-
violence is one that is strongly articulated in this conflict.  Moreover, empathy as a form of 
nonviolent resistance was a strategy articulated by both Palestinians and Israelis.59  It is one 
that maps onto the earlier definition of empathy which highlights the interwoven nature of 
cognition and emotion, the agency involved in the decision to engage in empathy and act 
accordingly, and the temporal dimension which is central to a situation of protracted 
conflict.  It also provides a counterpoint to the progressive and benign discourse of 
empathy.  Viewing empathy as a form of resistance unsettles the traditional categories of 
‘empathiser’ (stronger) and ‘sufferer’ (weaker party).  In the case of Israel and Palestine, 
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many of those who are deeply embedded in processes of empathy have themselves 
experienced suffering and trauma.  As has been recognised by Pedwell, ‘the act of ‘choosing’ 
to extend empathy or compassion can itself be a way to assert power.60  The act of choosing 
empathy is a political choice for those in both societies (as opposed to responding to the 
conflict in other ways).  The notion that it is the marginalised in Israel and Palestine who are 
actively engaging in empathy (and not only the strong) attributes agency to those who may, 
in conventional political terms, be considered to be the weaker parties. 
The complex map of relations amongst Palestinians, amongst Israelis, between 
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Israelis, and between Israelis and Palestinians defies any 
simplistic assumptions about ‘who’ is doing the empathising and ‘with whom’ despite the 
evident asymmetry of political power.  It is important to note that the asymmetry of the 
relationship between Israelis and Palestinians who encounter each other in many intergroup 
dialogues is clearly not the same as that experienced by minority voices within Israel for 
whom empathic engagement may also represent a form of resistance to the occupation and 
a process of transformation of the self.61  When actors choose to engage empathically with 
those in more (geopolitically) privileged positions, it is plausible to conceptualise this as a 
form of resistance to systems and structures of oppression.  Contact between groups and 
individuals may generate new political possibilities and discourses.  In a similar vein, Phillip 
L. Hammack has argued that contact may be a ‘potentially transformative – even potentially 
subversive – activity’ for groups in intractable conflict as it offers a ‘site to cultivate 
resistance and to repudiate a social order that benefits from the maintenance of 
antagonism’.62  I suggest this resistance can be articulated in a number of ways. 
Many of the narratives which are dominant within Israel and Palestine identify the 
‘other’ in highly polarised terms.63  Countering this by showing the other that you are an 
individual with experiences, emotions and beliefs is a form of resistance as it refuses to 
accept the dehumanising function of the Israeli occupation; instead it reiterates and gives 
resilience to the qualities of being human.64  It also serves to make transformation of the 
self and other possible across boundaries through processes of recognition, understanding, 
and the sharing of experiences.  This is not to be confused with normalisation; it does not 
mean that either party gives up their rights or their claims.65  While the Israeli occupation of 
the Palestinian Territories remains in place, exercising empathy does not change this fact.  In 
this sense, the value of and motivation for empathy is less about building bridges and 
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shared understandings between national groups under conditions of asymmetrical power 
and more about the construction and positioning of the self.  In this light it could be argued 
that adopting particular identities and narratives (and resisting others) contributes to 
securing a sense of self.   
Exercising empathy refuses to accept the inequalities of the occupation while at the 
same time contributing to individual identities, opportunities, emotions and beliefs, making 
it less likely that individuals will continue the cycle of violence through retaliation against 
others.  Adopting nonviolence, Bassam Aramin, a Palestinian member and co-founder of 
Combatants for Peace indicated, is good for Palestinians and it counters the stereotypical 
image of the violent Palestinian in the minds of others.66  According to Abdelfattah 
Abusrour, director of Alrowwad in Aida refugee camp, exercising empathy within and 
between groups contributes to the construction of a ‘beautiful self’ which focuses on what it 
is to be human amidst conditions of injustice; it feeds creativity and moral imagination; it 
creates resilience against the dehumanising elements of the conflict; it demands that we ask 
how we should treat others, and through its focus on being human it transcends political 
justifications for the continuation of the occupation.67  Recalling our concern with power 
relations, it was made clear by Zoughbi Zoughbi, director of the Wi’am Center in Bethlehem, 
that there are no elements of patronage or sympathy in this perspective; empathy is cast as 
a relationship between equals, as citizens, where actors take responsibility for the 
transformative process of the self and the relationship which exists and evolves between 
the self and other in a specific political context.68  These approaches are evident in a 
number of grassroots organisations which embrace non-violence and often focus on forms 
of education and self-development through art, music, drama, leadership, intra-group 
dialogue and education, mediation, nonviolent training, workshops, and media 
engagement.69  
Building on this sense of individual responsibility for transformation, empathy also 
provides a vital source of education about the conflict and it has the capacity to contribute 
to a third narrative which embraces a recognition of the history of both Israelis and 
Palestinians, of the Holocaust and the Nakba.  Karin Fierke has argued that it is necessary to 
create a space in which each side ‘can acknowledge how the acts of the Other have been 
conditioned by their own experience of suffering’.70  This serves to acknowledge how each 
side has contributed to the suffering of the other and breaks down the ‘absolute conviction 
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in one’s own victimhood’.71  This type of education is, for example, present in the 
educational (cultural, historical, political) tours offered by organisations such as 
MachsomWatch, Tiyul Rihla, the Wi’am Center, and Breaking the Silence (amongst others) 
for international visitors, Israelis and Palestinians.  In other words, empathy has the capacity 
to contribute to creating a cognitive dissonance72 which, I argue, may be a constructive 
vehicle for social and political transformation.  Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance 
suggests that when two elements are psychologically inconsistent they create a motivating 
force for individuals to resolve this dissonance.  In this context empathy offers a motivating 
force to reduce the psychological (and material) conflict through acknowledging the 
suffering of self and other.   
Much of the dominant contemporary narrative of the conflict in Israel and Palestine 
circles around (although is by no means limited to) two critical historical events: the 
Holocaust and the Nakba. Underpinning these events and their representation in public 
discourse are the ideologies of Zionism and Palestinian/Arab nationalism.  The conflict which 
emerged as a result of this early definition and contestation of the Jewish state is continued 
and reinforced through the memories of the traumas experienced during the Holocaust and 
the Nakba and their contemporary (re-)articulation.  Whilst the Holocaust was not central to 
the Israeli Zionist narrative until the 1960s, it has since become a critical component in the 
construction of Israeli collective memory and a sense of existential threat and insecurity.  
Both of these complex and many-stranded histories serve as legitimating and justificatory 
narratives for contemporary politics and shape the parameters of political debate within 
Israeli and Palestinian societies.73  Both, for many people on all sides of the conflict, cancel 
out the acknowledgement of the other and reinforce the collective trauma of both sides, 
thus limiting the capacity to widen the perception of multiple narratives.74  As Butler has 
argued, the ‘public sphere is constituted in part by what can appear, and the regulation of 
the sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as reality, and what will 
not.  It is also a way of establishing whose lives can be marked as lives and whose deaths will 
count as deaths’.75  This returns us to the act of recognition/denial of both individuals and 
collective narratives and the asymmetrical consequences of these decisions for the 
Palestinian and Israeli parties to the conflict.  Hearing and speaking the ‘unspeakable’, i.e. 
the narrative of the ‘other’ which is so often marginalised by social and political norms, 
might therefore be conceived as an act of non-violent resistance because it opens up 
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questions around reciprocal recognition and acknowledgement of the other, responsibility, 
vulnerability and the re-cycling of collective trauma and patterns of violence.76  As one 
Palestinian explained, ‘we must teach Israeli Jewish children about the Nakba and 
Palestinian children about the Holocaust’.77 
An example of the educative potential of face-to-face encounters can be found in 
the dual narrative approach adopted by the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East 
(PRIME) which brought Israeli and Palestinian teachers together between 2002 and 2009 to 
develop, and teach, a history text comprising of two, parallel, narratives for events across 
the last century for two nations.  The project aimed to initiate a process whereby ‘both 
peoples – especially the younger generation – [could] move beyond the one-dimensional 
identification with their own narrative’78 which serves to perpetuate justifications for 
conflict.  Conducted through iterative meetings in locations in Israel and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories the seven-year timeframe of the project reflected the recognition 
that ‘accommodating the dual-narrative approach demands long sequences of class time 
and cannot be achieved on a one-shot basis’.79  Illustrative of the fact that education 
through a complex process of narrative and empathy can represent a form of resistance 
were the considerable obstacles put in the way of those teachers who wished to bring the 
dual-narrative approach into their classrooms by both the Israeli and Palestinian authorities 
who each perceived it, for different reasons, to represent a political threat.80  The formal 
prohibition on teaching this material in the classroom by the authorities reveals the social 
and political constraints placed on re-framing the approach to education and wider political 
debates.  Some teachers responded by bringing the classroom into their homes and 
teaching students outside of the formal curriculum, such was the value they placed on this 
form of narrative education. 
There is an ongoing tension between the forms of empathy indicated above and the 
awareness of injustice while the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories continues.  
Awareness of this tension serves to reject the suggestion that empathy in this context is 
merely about the prospect of building bridges or transcending differences through 
interpersonal encounters with the ‘other’.  Instead, empathy emerges as a shifting and 
localised practice which may be engaged in by those within marginalised political (cultural 
and economic) positions as part of a strategy of resistance to the occupation and its 
dehumanising consequences (for both sides).  This manifestation of empathy fosters an 
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emancipatory possibility through its creative focus on what it is to be human under 
occupation. 
 
Empathy as normalisation 
The presence of asymmetric power relations does not only inform conceptualisations of 
empathy as a practice of resistance.  Importantly, it also shapes the understanding for some 
Palestinians that empathy may constitute a strategy of normalisation, thus coming under 
the umbrella of circumstances which Pedwell termed ‘empathetic failures’.81  This gives 
substance to the notion that empathy does not stand outside of politics and to the 
argument that the beneficial assumptions underpinning much of the discourse on empathy 
must be questioned.  In the context of Israel and Palestine, normalisation is a term laden 
with political meaning.  The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of 
Israel (PACBI) has defined normalisation as 
 
the participation in any project, initiative or activity, in Palestine or 
internationally, that aims (implicitly or explicitly) to bring together 
Palestinians (and/or Arabs) and Israelis (people or institutions) without 
placing as its goal resistance to and exposure of the Israeli occupation and all 
forms of discrimination and oppression against the Palestinian people.82  
 
Furthermore, PACBI indicates ‘It is helpful to think of normalization as a “colonization of the 
mind,” whereby the oppressed subject comes to believe that the oppressor’s reality is the 
only “normal” reality that must be subscribed to, and that the oppression is a fact of life that 
must be coped with’.83  This draws parallels with the notion of reification: a term first coined 
by Georg Lukács and adopted by other critical theorists to interrogate the process through 
which man-made phenomena appear as natural, unavoidable and objective, and whereby 
human beings treat each other instrumentally.   
Within the context of normalisation as defined by PACBI, dialogue efforts – which 
normally include an empathic element - are singled out for particular attention:  ‘Dialogue, 
“healing,” and “reconciliation” processes that do not actively aim to end oppression, 
regardless of the intentions behind them, serve to privilege oppressive co-existence at the 
cost of co-resistance, for they presume the possibility of coexistence before the realization 
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of justice’.84  This objection is realised most strongly in those activities which are based on 
interpersonal engagement or the contact hypothesis as it is known to social psychologists.  
The contact hypothesis, developed by Gordon Allport,85 is based on the view that ‘people in 
a conflict just need a chance to get to know each other and that once this happens, 
individuals will soon discover that beneath the mantle of group identity (e.g., Israeli or 
Palestinian) rests a much deeper and common identity – that of a human being’.86  This 
argument faces certain challenges however.  Even if the interpersonal meetings between 
Israelis and Palestinians are positive, is this attitude likely to extend beyond the individuals 
in dialogue to generate less prejudiced perceptions of Palestinians and Jews in general?  
And, even if this is so, then are such positive changes likely to persist when individuals 
return to communities who may not share these shifts in perception?  The problem of ‘re-
entry’ – returning to ‘normal’ life following such an encounter – has been highlighted by 
NGOs and academic-practitioners as a key reason for the failure of these efforts to bring 
about lasting political and social change.87 
While empathy is a core ingredient to these face-to-face encounters, there are two 
factors missing from them which shape the normalisation critique.  These are the 
requirement for equal status among the parties and a recognition of the role that social 
identity plays.88  When an encounter preserves the asymmetrical status of parties (e.g. 
Israelis and Palestinians) it is likely to reinforce existing inequalities and prejudicial 
perceptions rather than diminishing them.89  As Arie Nadler writes, we cannot ask 
individuals to leave ‘their robes of social belongingness and social identity outside the 
room’.90  To do so would be to require them to engage in a form of apolitical empathy 
uninformed by their own sense of belonging, history and identity.  Not only is this too 
psychologically demanding,91 but it fails to take into account the politics which shapes the 
asymmetrical experiences of participants.  These political and material asymmetries allocate 
recognition differentially, to use Butler’s terms, and interpretations of the role and purpose 
of empathy are shaped accordingly.  The expectations of such contact-based dialogue 
interventions usually pivot around reciprocity.  Yet as Dasa Duhaček and Hemmings make 
clear, there are historical and political reasons as to why this might not be possible or 
desirable: ‘incommensurabilites of location and perception may well disrupt the subject’s 
ability [or willingness] to transform herself through feeling as/for the other-subject’.92   
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Drawing on the experience of the School for Peace which has spent many years 
working on Arab-Jewish dialogue and encounter, Ramzi Suleiman raises an important issue 
which relates to the consequences of the lack of equal status.  He notes that in encounters 
between Israeli Arabs and Jews it is frequently the case that Palestinian participants seek to 
shift the interaction to the intergroup level to raise issues of a political and collective nature, 
focusing on the discrimination practiced by the Israeli state.  In contrast, it tends to be the 
case that Jewish participants prefer to shift interaction to the interpersonal level, thus 
avoiding political issues and normalising relations.  This is a direct consequence of the 
difference in power relations and feeds into the modes of conflict-oriented behaviours for 
each group.93   
This resonates with and explains the views articulated in interviews with some 
Palestinians that it is not possible for intergroup dialogue and peace-building work to be 
successful while the occupation continues.94  Such efforts, it is argued, serve to distract 
attention from the realities of the occupation and to hide the fact that the continuation of 
the status quo serves to protect particular political and economic interests.  Consequently, it 
is felt that these activities effectively maintain the existing asymmetries of power and status 
whilst ensuring that Israel preserves a constructive face to the outside world as it 
participates in these activities.95  Empathy – a core element in dialogue and peace-building 
work – has not, therefore, been perceived by critics of normalisation to contribute to 
sustainable political change.  Instead, such attempts which ‘normalise’ the conflict and 
occupation reflect what Cox identified as ‘problem-solving theory’ and raise the question 
who benefits from empathy of this kind.   
‘Empathy’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘peace-building’ are terms – and strategies incorporated 
into the international peace-building architecture - which represent disillusionment for 
many and are perceived to be destructive as they teach a language to individuals that not 
only is not shared by the communities they return to, but which does not change or reflect 
the daily political reality faced by those individuals outside the safe space of the workshop.  
Empathy through dialogue and other reconciliation processes offers an illusion of equality 
when conducted within facilitated workshops.96  When Palestinians go home through 
checkpoints and experience the injustices of the occupation this equality is revealed to be 
non-existent in daily life.  The consequences of this are that when taken outside of the 
framework of sustainable political transformation these dynamics can feed a process of 
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alienation, confusion, and conflicting identities for those who participate.  Supporting this 
perception of empathy as contributing to normalisation, Katz and Kahanov have stated that 
‘according to advocates of the political model [of interaction], the psychological model is 
manipulative’.97  It also runs the risk of de-politicising both individuals and the wider 
approach to the conflict by paying insufficient attention to the asymmetries of power.  In 
such contexts, interventions oriented towards increasing empathy and reducing intergroup 
hostility may backfire, serving to increase the negative emotions towards the outgroup and 
the level of mistrust between groups.98  Unlike empathy when constructed as a form of non-
violent resistance, this critique of empathy suggests that empathising contributes to a form 
of cognitive dissonance which is harmful to the individual and to the communities to which 
they belong.  In this context the dissonance is likely to be resolved through strengthening in-
group identities and adopting alternative strategies of resistance against the occupation.  
Once again the meaning attributed to empathy is tightly tied to narratives of the conflict 
and associated notions of identity. 
 
Conclusion 
Identifying empathy in lived experience as a variable and ethical-political strategy sustains 
the call articulated here for a more rigorous and critical engagement with empathy.  
Interpreting empathy as both a strategy of non-violent resistance and of normalisation 
enables an exploration of the production of meaning attributed to empathy.  Framing 
empathy in this manner acknowledges that it cannot be assumed to be benign or beneficial 
and draws our attention to the unavoidably political and situated character of empathy and 
to the need for interdisciplinary research to adequately explain the dynamics of empathy.  
This includes, but is not limited to, recent developments in the fields of social and cognitive 
psychology, neuroscience, peace studies, and narrative research. 
While it is difficult to escape the normative discourse of empathy when empathy is 
viewed as part of a struggle for recognition, the absence of which contributes to forms of 
social and psychological harm, it is nonetheless also necessary to recognise empathy as a set 
of lived practices which both connect and diverge with this normative perspective.  The call 
for a more critical approach to empathy in IR is thus shaped by a recognition that empathy, 
when understood as an effective way in which to end conflict, bridge differences between 
groups and reconcile past traumas was insufficient to account for the narratives and 
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experiences which were offered by interviewees.  A critical approach to empathy would 
encompass (at least) the following core issues and questions.  First, a normative 
acknowledgement and exploration of the transformative aspects of empathy whether it be, 
for example, a strategy of non-violent resistance or of reconciliation.  Second, it would 
engage with the structures, discourses, and institutions in societies that enable some forms 
of empathy and block others, thus sustaining a particular set of political and social 
conditions.  In so doing, it would explore, and seek to conceptualise, the lived experiences of 
empathy and the range of meanings attributed to empathy by actors in particular contexts 
over time.  The articulation of empathy as involving both cognitive and affective dimensions 
which leave open the purpose and intention motivating particular forms of interaction goes 
some way to address the concerns regarding benign assumption of care or progress often 
imputed to empathy.  As such, it does not shy away from the question who empathy may 
serve and for what ends.   
Third, it would address empathy across multiple levels of analysis within and 
between societies.  A key corollary to this is to enquire as to how, where, when and why 
empathy may emerge, how and by whom it is circulated, reciprocated, or blocked, how 
resilient these processes and actions are, how they are related to emotions more broadly 
within IR, and what their wider connection to social and political change might be.  These 
issues pose a number of implications for designing and reflecting on current international 
mediation, peace-building and conflict transformation approaches.  The link articulated 
between practices of empathy and the politics of normalisation explains, in part, why 
empathy, peace-building and dialogue projects are frequently perceived to be part of the 
problem rather than the solution in Israel and Palestine.  Even though these processes may 
contribute to transform individual perceptions, they ‘do not seem to make a major impact 
on society-wide norms, institutions and position of the broad public sphere’.99  There 
remains at present an insufficient theoretical or empirical account of processes which may 
engender or hinder the transfer of empathic processes from the individual and 
interpersonal level to societal-political structures.   
While the role of the individual is critical for empathy to be developed or blocked, 
the individual is embedded within a net of identities and beliefs which shape their capacity 
to transform their perceptions and behaviour and to translate that transformation into 
social and political change.  Identities are closely linked to collective narratives of the 
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conflict which are likewise a constitutive factor in shaping approaches to empathy.  Asaf 
Siniver has argued for recognition of the ‘importance of collective identities and enemy 
images in perpetuating intractable conflict’ and that ‘identifying these psychological barriers 
and then overcoming them are crucial steps towards successful conflict resolution’.100  Such 
collective and historical narratives as pervade the Israel-Palestine conflict reflect particular 
societal and emotional beliefs around security, the ‘enemy’ other, peaceful self-images, 
victimization, and the justness of one’s own goals which serve particular political 
justifications and contribute to perpetuating the cycle of violence and conflict.101  Such 
narratives serve to block the likelihood of empathy becoming institutionalized between 
ethno-national communities within the public discourse and at the level of elite leaderships, 
thus limiting the impact of empathic encounters at the grassroots and civil society level.   
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